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We consider a three-stage model of research and development (RBcD) to capture sotne key
clements of research joint ventures (RJV's). In the last of the three stages, firms compete in the
product market. In the second stage, the fitms simultaneously choose unobsetvable RBcD levels. In
the tïrst stage, the firms can share some or all of their knowledge with other firms in the RN. We
cxaminc thc ability of two simplc licensing mechanisms to ensure both e[ficient sharing of knowledge
and cCficient RBcD effort levels. Joumnl ojEconomic Lilerature Classification Numbers: D21, D82,
L20.1. Introduction.
Research joint ventures (RN's) are now commonplace throughout the wodd. Among the
many ongoing RJV's in the United States are Bell Communications Research, founded in 1984 by
the sevcn regional lclephone companies, and the Micrcelectronics and Computer Technology
Corporation (MCC), lormed in 1982 to conduct research related to information technology. A
primary goal of thwe and other RJV's is to exchange knowledge and develop basic expertise that the
founders of the RJV can ihen employ in thcir own research and development processes and in
subsequent marketplace activities.t Surprisingly, most economic models ofresearch and development
(RBcD) have not explicitly addressed the possibility that firms might share important inputs, such as
knowledge, before embarking on their own RáD programs.2 The primary focus of this paper is on
the design of rules an RN might adopt to motivate the sharing of productive knowledge among its
members, knowing that they will subsequently compete in both an RBcD contest to teduce production
costs, and ultimately in the product market. We concentrate on simple licensing schemes that could
be readily implemented in practice. We ask when these simple schemes can provide the ideal
incentives for both the sharing of knowledge and RBcD effort levels (i.e., when the schemes can
cnsurc a first-bcst outc:omc).
The licensing arrangements must overcome an obvious reluctance a firm will have to share its
knowlcdgc: sharing cnhances the likcly performance of competitors, and thereby can reduce one's
own chanccx of winninF thc RáD c;ontest. Indeed, it has been noted lhat the individual foundcrs
uf MCC wcrc initially rcluctant to scnd thcir best researchcrs to work at thc RJV's Cacililicxa, pe:rhaps
fearing that their best people would reveal more expertise than they received. Overcoming the
reluctance of a participant in an RJV to share superior knowledge can be a delicate matter. To
illustrate, one might attempt to motivate the sharing of knowledge by: (a) promising particularly large
rewards for winning the RBcD contest to the Fum that shared its superior knowledge in the first stage;-2-
and (b) imposing large licensing fees on winners of the second-stage contest if they received the
knowledge in the firat stage. Although such a(icensing structure might successfully motiva.e the
desired sharing of knowledge in the first stage, it might distort the RFcD activities undertaken by
participants in the second stage of "the game." In particular, the Frm that initially provided
knowledge to its competitors might undertake too much RBcD effort, while the ~mpetitors might
undertake too little effort relative to the social optimum.
We find that this potential conflict can be resolved with relatively simple licensing arrangements,
provided firns who initially received knowledge can be charged an entry fee for the right to
subsequently engage in the RBcD race. Although such entry fees may appear anticompetitive on the
surface, they can be instrumental in alleviating the tension between providing rewards for the sharing
of knowledge and motivating the first-best levels of RBtD effort.
This bazic tension can be insurmountable, however, when such entry fees are prohibited
(perhaps because of antitrust concerns or because the resources of firms are limited). When all
rewards for sharing knowledge must be delivered via licensing fees derived from the profits earned
in final-stage product-market competition, a first-best outcome may no longer be feasible. The
license fees required to induce the sharing of knowledge at the fust stage can distort second-stage
RBcD effort away from first-best levels. Nevertheless, there will be situations where this ideal
outcome can still be ensured, even witó the additional restrictions on the licensing mechanism We
characterize such situations, showing, for example, that a first-best outcome will be feasible when a
successful second-stage innovation is sufficiently likely or when the number of competitors is
sufficiently large. These and other related findings are presented in section 4.4
First, though, the basic elements of our model are desctibed in section 2 This section also
contrazts our paper with others in the literature, and defines the two licensing structures we analyze.-3-
Section 3 dctïnes a Grst-best outcome and identifies some important properties of the licensing
structures unclcr amsidcration. Cunclusions are drawn in section 5, where we suggest extension.c of
our modcl. All formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model.
There are three distinct stages in our model. In the fitst stage, N Fu~ms have the opportunity
to sharc their private knowledge with other Lrms. Greater knowledge enhances one's abilities in the
second-stage research and development (RBcD) eontest. During the second stage, firms employ their
knowledge independently in an attempt to successfully achieve an innovation of known social value,
V. For simplicity, the RBcD process for each fum is modeled as an "all-or-nothing" phenomenon:
either the innovation of value V is achieveà, or nothing is achieved. Although other interpretations
are possible, we will treat a successful innovation as a reduction in the constant marginal cost of
producing a homogeneous product from cH to c~. With inelastic demand at output Q, the social
value of the innovation is [cH - c~Q - V. The third stage of our model consists of Bertrand
competition among [irms who decide to produce.
At the start of the first stage, each of the N risk-neutral firms incurs a fixed cost which enables
it to privately observe its knowledge endowment. Each Eirm's knowledge endowment is modeled as
an indcpendent realization of a random variable, ii, with density f(n) ~ 0 V n E[n, n] and
corresponding distribution function F(n). Unless stated otherwise, the distribution of n is assumed
to have no mass points. A higher realized value of n corresponds to a higher level of knowledge, in
a sensc to be made precise belows After observing privately their own knowledge realiTation, the
tirms have an opportunity to simultaneously make public some or all of their knowledge. Revealed
knowledge can be verified costlessly; thus, a tirm cannot exaggerate its knowledge level. However,-4-
a firm could conceal some of its private knowledge rather than share all of it with competitors.
Whether knowledge is shared fully depends upon the anticipated reward for disclosure.
After disclosures are made, the second stage begins. During this stage, firms simultaneously
undertake an unobservable, immutable RBrD effort that is privately costly. Effort by firm i secures
a probability of success, P;. The cost to each firm of implementing success probability, P; when its
knowledge level is n e[n, n] is given by C(P, n).6 This cost includes a positive fixed cost, Ca which
must be incurred to achieve P~ 0.~ For a given level of knowledge, the cost of implementing success
probability P~ 0 is an increasing, strictly convex funcUon of P(i.e., CP(P, n) ~ 0 and CpP(P, n) ~
0 H n, P ~ 0, where subscripts denote the obvious partial derivatives). Higher levels of knowledge
reduce the lotal and marginal costs of implementation (i.e., Co(P, n) ~ 0 and CPo(P, n) ~ 0 b~ n, P
~ 0).s For simplicity, we also assume [1 - P) CP(P, n) is strictly monotonic in P for all n. This
assumption ensures that at the ideal (fitst-best) outcome (defined in section 3), each participating
finn chooses the same success probability.9
We assume that the knowledge levels of the firms in our model can be ordered in a Blackwell
sense [4]. Thus, if firms i and j have knowledge levels n; and ni, respectively, with n; ~ ni, only fitm
j can gain from an exchange of knowledge. At best, its knowledge level can be raised to n;.
Although other information structures are conceivable (see section 5), the Blackwell ordering we
adopt seems natural as a first step.to This ordering is also consistent with the observation in [14] that
some of the more successful joint ventures are those in which one firm provides knowledge to other
fu~ns, and receives no knowledge in retum.
What remains is to describe the two simple Gcensing mechanisms we consider. The central
feature of both mechanisms is that the leading firm (i.e., the órm that reveals the most knowledge
at the first stage) is treated more favorably than lagging fums (i.e., firms that do not reveal the most-5-
knowicdge) in order to providc incentives to share superior knowledge. 'Iite differential treatment
encompasses the Collowing asymmetric restrictions on a firm's right to employ the innovation it
achieves. There are no restrictions on the leading fitm. The leading firm never pays a licensing fee
and is always Cree to employ any innovation it develops. On the other hand, a lagging firm that is
the only lagging firm to succeed at the RBtD stage is permitted to employ its innovation, but is
charged a fee of rV for doing so.tt (The choice of r E(0, 1) will be described in detail below.)
Most importantly, this licensing fee mtut be paid by the "licensed" firm to the leading Frm if and only
if the licensed firm earns at least V in the final-stage product market competitíon. Otherwise, the
licensed firm, like all other lagging firm.c, pays no fee.t2
When two or more lagging firms successfully develop the innovation, one is chosen at random
to be thc licensed firm. The chosen firm is required to pay V as a licensing fee to the leading firm,
provided the licensed firm earns at least V in final-stage profit.t~ The successful lagging firms that
are not licensed forfeit all rights to their innovation.ta,u
When the sole forms of compensation fot the leading fitm are any direct profit it earns in the
product market and the license Cees charged to a licensed lagging firm, it is said that restricted
licensing (RL) is in place. As we show in section 4, there are plausible settings where the ideal
incentives for both thc initial sharing of knowledge and subsequent RáD effort by all firms can be
ensured under RL via suitable choice of the licensing fee, rV. Sometimes, though, strict gains are
available when entry into the RBcD race can be priced and controlled directly. Under unrestricted
licensing (UL), a uniform entry fee (E) can be imposed on all lagging 6rms who wish to enter the
second-stage RBcD competition. This fee is paid to the leader, and is not contingent upon realized
proft. Thc lagging firms can choose not to engage in RBcD if they consider the fee for doing so to
be too high. But if they do engage in RBtD, they must first pay the fixed charge E to the leading~-
firm. We show in section 4 that through suitable choice of r and E, the ideal incentives for
knowledge sharing and RBcD elfort can aiways be ensured under UL if the leader can also dictate
the ma~mum number of firms who compete at the RBcD stage. Thus, despite their anticompetitive
appearance, entry fees and entry prohibitions may actually promote the social interest Of course,
given the practical difficulties of excluding entry into markets (e.g., legal issues of market definition),
UL may not be feasible in some settings where RL is feasible.
There are three key features of these licensing mechanisms that warrant emphasis and
explanation. First, the payoffs to individual firms depend upon the number of other firms who have
successfully developed the innovation. Because the sociat value of success by a fit~t also depends
upon whether another firm has succeeded, this feature helps align the private and social incentives
to conduct RBcD. Second, licensing fees are contingent upon the realization of final-stage profits.tb
1'his feature makes credible the promise of a successful leading firm to refrain from product-market
competition against licensed lagging firms. Thus, dissipative competition is avoided. (See Lemma
2.) Third, under UL, lagging firms must pay in advance for the knowledge they receive, and so entry
into the RBtD race is priced explicidy.t~ As noted, this additional policy instrument can be critical
to ensuring adequate incentives for full sharing of knowledge.
Both RL and UL entail an important restriction. Neither scheme allows payments by or
treatment of a lagging firm to depend on any cardinal measure of the difference between its
knowledge disclosure and those of the leader and~or any other lagging fitm. This limited ability to
discriminate among firms is natural in settings where the knowledge levels of lagging firms are not
verifiable. For example, when imitation lags are short, fítms might be able to represent much of the
knowledge revealed by others as their own. As other authors have noted (e.g., [2], [6], and [24]), it
is often difficult in practice to discern the extent to which a lagging researcher is less infonmed when-~-
professional activity entails dissemination of proprietary knowledge. Consequently, feasible licensing
fees can only make a crude distinction between the most knowledgeable firm and less knowledgeable
ones.
It should also be noted that neither the tenns of RL nor those of UL depend upon the initial
distribution of knowledge among fitms, f(n). Therefore, both licensing mechanisms could be
implemented without any information about f(~), which, in practice, might not be readily available.
This fact, coupled with the simple lump-sum licensing and entry fees under RL and UL make both
schemes relatively straightfotward to implement.
Bcforc prcxccding to our findings wc brielly rcitcratc the timing and information structure of
the modcl. The first stage begins with the speciFcation of the terms of the overall licensing
arrangcment. Then, each of the N firms privately observes its knowledge level. Next, to complete
the first stage, firms make independent, simultaneous public disclosures of knowledge. After
observing all disclosures and after the leading firm has been certified (by an impartial ovetseer)18, the
lagging firms decide whether to enter the second stage RBcD contest. Upon entering, the firms
simultancously make independent, irrevocable, and unobservable choices of RBtD intensities. The
outcome of each tirm's RáD process (i.e., success or failure) is then observed publicly. Next, at the
start of the third stage, if there are any successful lagging firms, one is selected as the sole lagging
firm with the right to employ the superior technology. Next, the firms decide whether to compete
in the product market or ept the industry.19 Finally, after production occurs and profits are realized,
the asse.s.scd Iicensing fees are paid. The game is not rcpcated.
Thc cyuilibrium conccpt cmploycd is Bayesian-Nash ([16]), wuplcd with thc critcrion of
perfection ([30]) applied to final production decisions. At the start of the second stage of the RBtD
contest, each firm chooses a success probabiliry to marimize its expected profit, given its beliefs about-s-
the knowledge of its competitors and knowing that its competitors will aLso select profit-ma~mizing
effort levels. At the first stage, firms choose disclosure levels to maximize expected proGt, given
beGefs about the knowledge levels of competitors, and knowing the terms of the licensing scheme,
the nature of the subsequent game, and the equilibrium strategies of competitors.
Having specified our basic model in detail, we can contrast our fotmulation and findings with
others in the RBr.D literature. To begin, our focus differs from the "standard" models of RBcD races
(e.g., [7], [22], [28], and [29]) in that we are concerned with motivating both the ef6cient sharing of
knowledge and efficient RBcD effort levels. Our concetn with sharing inputs to the RBcD process
also distinguishes our work from the standard treatments of cooperative RBcD. In [18], for example,
the profit-maximizing sharing of research costs and research findings is examined, but there is no
explicit consideration of the sharing of knowledge or other inputs to the RBcD process.~ Our focus
on the sharing of knowledge and on the ma~mization of social welfare, coupled with the different
policy instruments we consider, lead us to results which differ from those in [18]. In particular, we
find that the ideal social outcome may be obtained from the RBcD joint venture even when the
product market is characterized by Bertrand competition. This result arises because, as noted above,
the successful leading firm will choose not to compete with the licensed lagging firm under RL and
UL.
In [20], the decision of a research lab to develop an innovation and to licease the innovation
todownstream oligopolists is ana(yzed. In that model, the oligopolists compete in the output market,
but they do not use the innovation obtained from the research lab to engage in independent RBcD.
Thus, the basic innovation needs no further testing or development as it does in (the second stage
oE) our model. Furthermore, there is no concem in [20] with motivating the sharing of knowledge
among members of the research lab. Despite the additional complicatioac in our model, the first-best-9-
outcome can be secured in our model when it does not arise in [20] becatsse of differences in feasible
licensing mechanisms. In [13J, lhe incentives of a firm to share its superior knowledge with a
competitor in the RáD race are considered. However, the Gcensing fees analyzed in [13] are again
different in nature from outs, and are not motivated by the efficiency concerns that are central in our
analysis.
The importance of examining ways to motivate the sharingofknowledge in RN's is recognized
in [19], but the formal models in [19] do not address this issue. Tèe formal analysis most closely
rclated to the prescnt analysis is our awmpanion paper [1]. In (1J, a simple environment is assumed
to avoid the nonconcavity in each firm's maximization problem that complicates the present analysis.2t
Our companiun paper also Rkuscs un the design oC seccmd-hut incentive schemex. Our exclusive
concern in this paper is whether a first-best outcome can be achieved. We now turn to a formal
characterization of a first-best outcome.~~
3. Preliminary Results.
In this section, we briefly characterize a first-best outcome in which disclosures {di} and RBtD
effort Icvels {pi} are selected to maximize the expected total surplus less the costs incurred by the
firms. We also describe some important characteristics of RL and CTL.
DeTnition. A órst-best outcome is the solution to the following problem:
IV l (d
Maximize 1-~ (1 - Pi) I V -~ C(Pi,max{ni,d})
P,d,N i-1 J i-1
subjcct to: d- max(d~, ..., dNl, di 5 n~ V i- l, ..., N; and N c N,
where Pi - the second-stage success probability of firm i.-la
As is evident from (3.1), first-best success probabilities are chosen to mapmize the difference
between: (1) the product of V and the probability that at least one firm succeeds in the second-stage
RdcD contest; and (2) the aggregate cost of RBiD effort. N is the number of firms that compete
in the second-stage RB~D contest. We have normalized the identity of the N firms so that the fust
N enter the second stage. Unless stated otherwise, we will assume that the optimal 1V is invariant
to the maximum realized knowledge endowment n e[~ n].
L.emma 1 characterizes a first-best outcome. In the statement of the lemma, Sh(n) refers to the
expected social surplus when the first h firms participate in the second-stage RBcD contest, each with
knowledge level n, and when each firm undertakes the fust-best level of RBcD effort.
h h
Definition. Sh(n) - 1-~ [ 1- Pn'(n)] V-~ C(ph'(n), n), where
~-i ,-~
n
Ph~(n) - argmax {P V~ [1 - P~'(n)] - C(P, n)]} b' i-1,...,h.
P
Lemma 1. In a first-best outcome:
(i) d - n - ma~ámum {nt, ..., nN};
(ii) SN(n) - argmax Sh(n) ; and
h5N
([li) p~ - pN.(n) - argmax { P[ 1- PN'(n)]N-t V- C(P, n)1 `d i- 1. ..., N. P
The conclusions of the lemma are quite intuitive. All knowledge is disclosed and shared (i.e.,
d- n) in order to maximize the capabilities of all firms. The number of firms (N) that participate-t t-
in the second-stage RRcD contest is the number that maximizes total expected surplus. Furthermore,
succcss prubabilitics (P~) are chosen to maximize; their expected net wntribution to social surplus.~
An important feature of a first-best outcome is teported in Corollary I.
Corollary I. In a first-best outcome, the expected matginal contribution of each firm that
participatcx in the second-stage RBtD contest is strictly positive, i.e,
M"(n) - pN.(n)~I - P"'(n)]"-t V- C(PN'(n), n) ~ 0.
Corollary I follows directly from the presumed fixed cost, Co, of achieving any success
probability P ~ 0. The corollary suggests that the ability to control participation in the second-stage
RBcD contest will be important if a first-best outcome is to be ensured, since the private profit
incentives of individual firms may not be perfectly aligned with the social incentives.u
Our concern throughout the analysis is whether a first-best outcome can be ensured under RL
andlor UL To invcstigate this issue, it is useful to first examine the incentives RL and UL provide
at the second-stage RBcD contest and the third-stage product market competition. Lemmas 2 and
3 address these incentives.
Lemma 2. Under both RL and UL, if a lagging fírm succeeds at the RBcD stage, the leader will
not engage in product market competition with the Gcensed lagging firm.
The proofof Lemma 2 is immediate. If the leader competes with the licensed lagging firm, the
prolit of both 6rms is driven to zero by Bertrand competition. On the other hand, the leader can
ensure itself a strictly positive payoff, rV, by not competing, since the licensed firm must pay the
specified Iicense fee when its protits from the product-market competition are sufficiently large.-12-
Thus, the licensing rules in RL and UL prevent dissipative final-stage competition between the
leading and lagging fuats. In doing so, RL and UL can provide ideal incentives for second-stage
RBtD ef~ort, as indicated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Suppose full disclosure (d - n- max {nt, ..., nN}) and the fust-best particípation level
(N) are ensured. Then first-best RáD effort levels will arise as the unique symmetric Nash
equihbrium of the second-stage RBr.D contest under RL and UL when a sole lagging innovator
is assessed a licensing fce of PN~(n)V, (i.e., when r- PN~(n) ).
Lemma 3, which is closely related to the findings in [29], helps explain the appeal ofthe simple
licensing rules in RL and UL. With the licensing fee set at V when two or more lagging firats
succeed at the RBzD stage, Lemma 2 ensures a lagging firm anticipates a profit of [1 - r]V if and
only if it succeeds alone or in conjunction with the leading firm. Otherwise, iu proót is zero. Thus,
the expected profit of a lagging fitm that chooses success probability P when all other firms choose
PN'(n) is:
P[ 1-r] V[1 - PN'(n)]N-z - C(P, n)
- P[ 1- PH'(n)]N-t V- C(P, n) when r- PN'(n). (3.5)
Similarly, under RL and UL, the second-stage expected profit of the leading 6rm does not varywith
its succcss probability unless all of the lagging tirms fail. Thus, with r- PN'(n) under RL and UL,
the calculus of the leading firm, too, is ret7ected in (3.5). Therefore, since social surplus is realized
only when a fu-m succeeds alone (i.e, when the other IV - 1 firms fail, which occuts in equilibrium with
probability [1 - PN'(n)]H't), the private and social incentives for RBrD effort coincide under both RL
and UL when the licensing fee for a sole lagging innovator is set at PN'(n)V. Since our ezclusive-13-
concern is determining when a first-best outcome is ensured undet RL and UI., henceforth any
reference to these licensing schemes will presume the licensing fee, rV, is set equal to the product
of V and the first-best success probability given first-best disclosure and participation levels.
Finally, before proceeding to our main conclusions, it is useful to derive expressions for the net
expected payoCts of the firms under RL and UL. In Lemma 4, ~rrR(n, d ~ N) represents the expected
pro(it under RL of the 6rm (say firm N) with knowledge level n who discloses d ~ n to its N-I first-
and second-stage competitors, given that these competitors fully reveal their knowledge endowments.
In Lemma 5, ,r~(n, d ~N) represents the corresponding expected proót measure under UL when the
N-1 lagging tirms who enter the second-stage RBtD competition pay the specified entry fee, E.
Lemma 4.
TrR(n, dIN) -{V [P"(n, d)[I-P"'(d)]"-t ; T(d~N)] - C(P"(n, d), n)}G"-1(d)
n
' J{V P"(n, m)[I - P".(m)]"-t - C(P"(n, m), n)}dG"-t(m)
4 J{V P"'(m)[I - P"'(m)]"-t - C(P"'(m), m)}dG"-t(m),
n
where T(d~N) - 1 - [1 - PN'(d)]"-t [1 t (N - 1)P"~(d)], (3.7)
Cr"-t(x) - Prob(max {nt, ..., nN-1} s x), (3.8)
P"'(y) solves: V[I - P"~(Y)J"' - Cr(P"~(Y), Y) - 0, and (3.9)
P"~(x, Y) solves: V[I - P"~(y)j"-I - Cp(P"(x, y), X) - 0, foi R ~ y. (3.I~)
The first line in (3.6) retlects the órm's expected profit when it turns out to be the leader. This-14
expected profit, net of RBrD costs, is composed of: (1) the leader's reward (V) when it succeeds
alone (which happens with probability PN(~)[1- PN'(,)]N't); and (2) its reward (PN'(-)V) when exactly
one of the lagging fuau succeeds (which occuts with probability [N - 1JPN'(~)[1 - PN.(,)JN'Z), and its
reward (V) when two or more of the lagging firms succeed (which occurs with probability 1-[i -
pN'(,)7N-1 ~- 1]PN.(.)[1 - pN.(,)]N-z) ~e last two lines in (3.6) reflect the profit of a lagging firm.
Recalll that [he lagging firm receives [1 - PN~(.)]V when it succeeds and all of the other lagging firms
fail. Otherwise it receives 0.
Lemma 5. With entry fee E(d),
é
~~(n~ d~N) ' ~R(n, d~N) t [N-1]E(d)~-t(d) - JE(E)d~-t(E).
d
(3.11)
Thus, the expected profit of the firm under UL is ezactly its profit under RL plus expected
revenues from entry fees when it is the leader less the expected entry fee it must pay when its
disclosure, d, is not the highest.~
4. Findings.
We state our main conclusions formally in this section. In Proposition 1, we report that
judicious use of UL will always ensure a first-best outcome. Propositions 2 and 3 present conditions
which are sufficient to ensure RL also Icads to a first-best outcome. Proposition 4 reports that the
difference in expected payoff for a firm under UL vetsus RL becomes negligible as the first-best
number of fïrms becomes infinitely large. Because of the restrictions it embodies, however, RL will
not always implement a first-best outcome. Proposition 5 concludes that if knowledge is sufficiently
rare and valuable, RL may not induce full disclosure of knowledge. On the other hand, Proposition
6 reports that RL may result in too much disclosure and excessive participation in the second-stage-15-
RRD contest.
Proposition 1. Suppose the leading Eirm can dictate the number (N c N) of firms that participate
in the second-stage RBtD contest. Also suppase E(d) - MN(d) as deFmed in (3.4), where d
is the Ievel o( knowledge disclosed by the leading firm. Then a first-best outcome is ensured
under UL.
By wnstruction, both RL and UL induce first-best RBcD effort levels when all knowledge is
disclosed and the first-best number of second-stage competitors is ensured. (Recall Lemma 3.)
Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the leading firm receives the full social value of the Imowledge
it reveals, because the lagging firms are charged an entry fee that drives to zero their expected profit
from participating in the second-stage RBcD contest. Furthermore, since the leading firm's objective
coincides with the social objective (recall (3.1)) under UL, the leading fitm will choose the number
of second-stage participants to matámize the expected social surplus.n
From this point on, it is assumed that under UL, E(d) is set at the Icvel identified in
Proposition 1. It rcmains to determine whether a first-best outcome can be ensured even when
lagging l;rms cannot be charged such an entry fee for the right to engage in second-stage RBcD.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 address this question.
Proposition 2. Full disclosure of private knowledge by all firms is guaranteed under RL if
pN~U ~ 1, where N is the number of participating firtns.
N
Intuitively, if the equilibrium probability of success is sufEciently large even with the minimal
level of knowledge, RL can provide sufficient incentive for disclosure, and additional entry fees are
not csscntial. I Icnce, whcn disclosure is in the social intcrest, RL ensures a first-bcxt outcomc.-36-
Corollary 2. Suppose PN'(n) ? 1RV and the optimal participation level, N, is implemented. Then
RL ensures a first-best outcome.
A conclusion analogous to Proposition 2, but one that is based entirely on the primitives in the
model, can be derived when the optimal number of firms (N) is large. When N is large, the
probability that two or more lagging fïrms succeed simultaneously becomes large, provided the RBr.D
effort level ofeach firm is not too small. Therefore, since the leading firm receives the entire surplus
in the event ofsuch "ties" under RL, sufficient incentive will be provided to motivate full disclosure
of knowledge. Furthcrmore, sufficiently high RáD effort lcvels are motivated from all firms when
the marginal cost of increasing the second-stage success probability above zero is small, even for the
lowest level of knowledge. These observations are made precise in Proposition 3 and Corollary 3.
Proposition 3. When the number of participatíng órms, N, is sufficientty large, RL guarantees full
disclosure of private knowledge if CP(0, n) ~ V, where e is thc base of the natural logarithm.
e
Corollary 3. Suppose the first-best participation level, N, is implemented.ffi Then for N sufficiently
large, RL ensures a first-best outcome if CP(0, n) ~ V
e
Proposition 3 suggests a relationship between the expected profit of firms under RL and UL
as the number of Firms becomes large. As Proposition 4 reports, the difference between these two
payoffs may become negligible for the leading firm when N is suf6ciently large.
Proposition 4. Suppose: (i) CP(0, n) - 0 b' n E[n, n j; or (ii) N, the number of second-stage
participants, is equal to that in a first-best outcome, N. T'hen,-I7-
lim {-rr~(n, n ~ N) --rrR(n, n ~ N) }- 0.
rr~
Under condition (i) in Proposition 4, the probability that exactly one firm will succeed in the
second-stage RBtD contest approaches zero as N-~m. Consequently, the expected profit of a lagging
firm becomes negligible and [(N - 1)MN(n)] tends to zero. Furthet7nore, the fact that
lim [ IV - I] MN(n)- 0 holds generally when the first-best number of researchers is large.
r~
Consequently, with thc Ieading órm being ncarly certain that it will sccure the entire surplus (~
because a second-stage "tie" among lagging firms is so likely, RL can generate nearly the same
incentive Cor disclosure of knowledge that UL can.
More generally, however, the inability to impose second-stage entry fees will hinder the
performance of RL. In particular, when high knowledge is both rare and valuable and the optimal
number ofsecond-stage participants is small, the reward for disclosure under RL will be too meager.
This intuition is made precise most readily by introducing a mass point at the lowest level of
knowledge, n.
I'roposition 5. Suppose IV - 2, PZ'(n) - e, and F(n) - I- S. Then for e~ 0 sufficiently small
and S~ 0 sufficiently small, RL will not induce full disclosure of knowledge.
Proposition 5 considers a setting where it is very likely that a typical fitm will have the lowest
level of knowledge, n. Furthermore, effort is sufficiently costly with low levels of knowledge that the
6rst-best success probability is very small. Therefore, by disclosing a level of knowledge only slightly
above n, the more knowledgeable firm can be almost certain that it will be established as the leader
and that its competitots will not succeed at the second stage. In this setting, a fitm with a high level-18-
o! Icnowledgc cannot bc induccd to fully disclose this knowledge to wmpetitors becausc thc rcward
for disclosure under RL is too small relative to the expected profit from conccaling superior
knowledge and then employing it in an attempt to succeed alone.
The inability of RL to ensure full disclosure in situations where full disclosure is desired is not
its only flaw. RL may also elicit too much disclosure. This possibility is demonstrated in the proof
of Proposition 6 using an example where the optimal N varies with n.
Proposition 6. There exist settings where RL induces full disclosure of private knowledge, even
though less than full disclosure is in the social interest.
The fact that too much disclosure may be elicited under RL stems from a different type of
divergence between private and social incentives. Recall that the leading firm receives a licensing
fee equal to the entire social surplus (~ whenever two or more lagging firms succeed at the RáD
stage. Thus, the leader gains from such ties, even though the social value of a second success is zero.
Consequently, when the primary effect of disclosure is to enhance the probability oF a second-stage
tie (and thus create "excessive" RBcD competition), RL can even induce full disclosure when no
disclosure is in the social interest, as the proof of Proposition 6 illustrates.~
5. Conclusions and Extensions.
We have examined the ability of two simple licensing mechanisms to motivate efficient sharing
of knowledge and subsequent independent RBcD activity. Unrestricted licensing (UL), in which
lagging firms are charged a fixed fee for the knowledge they acquire from the leading firm, was shown
to ensure a first-best outcome whenever the leader can control entry into the RBcD contest.
Restricted licensing (RL), where entry fees are not feasible, can also ensure a fïrst-best outcome in-19-
some settings (e.g., where a successful innovation is sufficiently Gkely), but will fail to do so in other
settings (e.g., where superior knowledge is sufficiently rare and valuable). Under both UL and RL,
the leading firm receives licensing fees from profitable lagging firms that succeed at the RBcD stage.
Ihus, licensing fees which require lagging firms to share realized profit with the leading firm will be
sufficient to ensure efficient sharing of knowledge and RBtD effort in somesettings, but not in others.
One implication of our findings is that social gains may arise if: (1) some firms who successfully
develop an innovation are prohibited from employing the innovation; (2) some fitms can be charged
for the right to engage in independent RBcD; and (3) some firms are prohibited by othets from
engaging in RBrD. Of course, great care must be taken in interpreting these conclusions for three
re:uuns. First, these policicx are optimal in our model only under eertain cireumstanees, and the
obvious antitrust concerns these policies raise in other circutnstances are real and important~
Second, the conclusions arise in a particular economic model with some special features. It remains
to dctcrmine how robust these insights are to variations in the model.3i Third, it may be difficult in
practice to control entry into a market, particularly since precise market definitions are not easily
formulated.
A number of extensions of our model remain to be considered. First, a richer space of
outcomes for the RBcD process should be explored. The succe.cc versus failure dichotomy in our
model is illustrative, but speciaL Second, alternative forms of product-market competition should be
considered (as in [18j). With less intense final-stage competition among members of the RJV, it may
be less difFcult to motivate the sharing of knowledge. Third, actual research need not be carried out
independently by the membets of the RJV. If firms can coordinate RBtD activities, they may be more
willing to share basic knowledge. Fourth, the RBtD race might proceed in different fashion. For
example, firms may be able to alter their RBtD efforts over time after observing the progress of their-Za
competitors (as in [13J). Fifth, alternative characterizations of innate knowledge should be analyzed.
In many instances, members of an RN may possess complementary knowledge. In this case, firms
might be less reluctant to share their knowledge if they are certain [o receive useful complementary
knowledge in return. However, the differences may only be a matter of degree. Perhaps of greater
practical importance in the case of complementary knowledge is that it may be more difficult to
specify the appropriate wmpensation Cor revelation of knowledge, because it may not even be
straightforward to identify the firm that revealed the "most" knowledge.3Z
Sixth, it would be interesting to examine the governance rules for an RN that would arise
endogenously from bargaining among firms with asymmetric information. Seventh, repeated
interactions among fuTns in the RJV should be considered. Repeated play introduces a broader range
of possible policy instruments, including the ability to base licensing fees on the entire history of a
fum's contributions to the joint venture. Furthermore, a fum may be more willing to provide
knowledge to competitors today if it anticipates they will reciprocate in the future. Eighth, it would
be interesting to incorporate the possibility that research within an RN might proceed in difT'erent
directions, as it does in practice. It may be easier to motivate a fn-tn to reveal knowledge when the
reward for doing so includes the right to choose a direction for future research in the RN.3~ Finally,
the task of motivating individual researchers within an RN merits careCul attention.~
Of course, a complete investigation of RJV's must provide a characterization of the optimal
second-best rules when a first-best outcome is not obtainable. Two qualitative departures from the
ideal are possible. First, too much or too little disclosure may be induced. Second, deviations from
the optimal second-stage RBcD effort levels may be motivated. In the simplified setting of [1J, full
disclosure is always motivated, but inefficient RBtD effort leveLs are induced when a first-best
outcome is not feasible.~"L1
FOOTNOTES
1. For example, it is stressed in [27] that participants in MCC maintain their own RBcD programs,
and that MCC places no restrictions on these programs. See [9] and [14] for additional
thoughts on the goals and policics of RJV's.
2. Important cxccptions are [13], [l8], and [19]. Titese works are discussed in greater dctail
below.
3. See [9].
4. As will become apparent, our focus is entirely upon motivating the shating ofknowledge among
members of an RJV. We do not address the issue of spillovers of researcó findings to firms
that are not members of the RJV. It is argued in [27] that at least in the computer and
semiconductor industries, these spillovers are of limited importance. The key determinant of
competitive success in these industries is a 6rm's lead time in the RBcD process.
5. One might view this as a process where each ofN firms hires a researcher from an infinite pool
ofobservationally equivalent researchets. Eventually, each researcher's ability to conduct RBcD
becomes known privatcly to the f"irm that hired him. Thus, the skill of the hired researcher
determines the firm's knowledge in this interpretation. Of course, there are a number of
obvious simplifications in this story. );trst, firms that hite óad" researchers do not return to the
pool of researchers and obtain another "draw." This may be due to large set-up costs or long
lags between the time a researcher is hired and when he learns his skill (eveL Second the
researcher's skill becomes known to the firm, and effectively becomes the property ofthe firm.
There are a variety of interesting issues concerning the intellectual property of employees that
are beyond the scope of this paper.2"G
6. This cost function, like the density function f(n), is common knowledge.
7. A strictly positive fixed cost ensures that the socially optimal number of researchers is finite.
This fixed cost should be thought of as the cost required to utilize any disclosed knowledge
IeveL
8. Obviously, this cost structure is a reduced fotm of a more complex underlying procesc of
knowledge sharing. One such process is the following. Suppose there are a countable infinity
of development techniques that can be employed to develop the innovation. Each technique
appears the same to firms ex ante, in the sense that each costs the same to employ, and each
is thought capable of implementing the innovation with probability q. Each firm that expends
a fixed cost, Co, becomes capable of testing techniques. A óad" technique (i.e., one that is
certain to fail) can be identified with probability one by any test. A"good" technique (i.e., one
that will succeed if adopted) will be identiFed as such by a test with probability n e(0, 1), and
wil] be erroneously categorized as a bad technique with probability 1- n. Tims, a higher n
represents a more accurate test. This n represenu a firm's basic knowledge level in this
example, and a fitm can share its knowledge by showing other firms how to increase the
accuracy of their test of techniques to probability d 5 n. Given n(or d, the level of knowledge
disclosed), a firm can choose a probability of successful innovation by choosing the maximum
number of techniques it will test (t) in the second stage. (Similar arguments apply to sequential
sampling.) The cost of testing t(~0) techniques, Cl(t), is a strictly increasing convex function.
Straightforward calculations show that in this environment, the indirect cost function for
identifying a good technique with probability P, i.e., C(P, n) has the properties described above.
In this setting, a firm with knowledge level n will identify a good technique in t samples with
probability P- 1-[1 - q t q(1 - n)j`.23
~1. This Cact i.e proved in Le:mma I tx;low. Notice that this monotonicity wndition is satis6ed in
the sampling interpretation of the cost structure outlined in the preceding footnote.
10. Notice that this ordering is analogous to that presumed in the related literature on multistage
RBcD races. (See, for example, [10], [13], [15], and [17].) In that literature, a sequence of
projects must be completed in a speci6ed order before an innovation is achieved. F' itms that
have completed more projects can assist the progress of Erms that have completed fewer
projects, but the reverse is not true. It is precisely this unidimensional azpect of knowledge
sharing that the presumed Blackwell ordering implies in our model.
Notice that in the context of the sampling interpretation developed above, the Blackwell
ordcring implies that whenever a test with accuracy nt identifies a technique as ~ad," so will
any other test with lower accuracy nZ ~ nt.
11. If two or more [irms disclose the same level of knowledge, one is selected at random to be the
Icadcr and the other firms are designated az lagging 6rms. With no mass points in the
distribution of n, however, the probability of identical disclosures by firms in a first-best setting
is uro.
12. The practice of making payments contingent upon realized profit is not without precedent in
RJV's. Under the hojolàn system, the Japanese government commonly provides funding to
RJV's in the form of interest-free loans with the explicit condition that these loans be repaid
from profits that tlow from technology produced by the RJV. (See [19] and [25].)
13. Alternatively, the multiple innovating lagging fitms could bid for the exclusive right to employ
the innovation as in [20]. An appropriately designed auction will yield V to the leading firm.
14. When the licensing fee is V, the licensed lagging firm will technically be indifferent between24
compctíng and not competing in thc product market. But the firm will strictly prefer to
compete for any licensing fee strictly less than V. We avoid an uninteresting opea set problem
by assuming the authorized finn competes when indifferent between doing so and not
competing.
15. It is conceivable that multiple lagging firms who develop the innovation simultaneouslywill have
an incentive to collude and hide their "tie" from the leading firm, so as to pay a lower licensing
fee. However, sucó collusion would require private communication, clandestine side-payments,
and mutual verification of claims of success. Without this verification, all firms would have an
incentive to claim a tie with a successful lagging firm in order to secure compensation for not
disclosing his success to the leading firm. These requirements tend to make successful collusion
unlikely.
16. This linking of license fees to realized profit distinguishes the licensing fees we consider from
~husc considcrcJ in ~21~.
17. The key feature of the entry fee is not that it is paid in advance, but rather that the obligation
to pay the fee does not vary with profit earned in the product market. The Cee could
conceivably be paid after the product market competition has taken place if the overseer can
certify in advance that each firm has sufficient wealth to pay the fee even ifno profit is earned
in the product market. However, such certification may be problematic because the first-best
fee will depend on the maximum disclosure of knowledge, and the overseer is not presumed
to have any knowledge of the distribution of n(including its upper support).
18. In practice, the impartial overseer might be a government repcesentative with sophisticated
research skills. In Japan, engíneers from the government's Ministry of International Trade and25
Industry played an active role in managing day-to-day activities in the Very Large Scale
Integration Consortium (VISI). (See [19].)
19. As a notirtalization, we presume all unsuccessful firats compete in the third-stage product
market competition. However, they earn no profit in equilibrium from doing so.
20. Similarly, the analysis ofRIV's in [26] does not analyze in detail this link between initial sharing
of knowledge and subsequent RBcD effort levels. In [ll], the authots e~camine whether the
ideal incentives can be created for fitins to tailor their RBtD effort levels to their privately-
known RBcD abilities. No sharing of ability is possible in their model, however.
21. 'Iite nonconcavity arises in our model because the usual "Spencian" monotonicity condition on
the incentive payotF structure is not satisfied. In particular, it is not the case that the marginal
cost of incremental technological disclosure to a firm is lower the greater is its initial knowledge
endowment. This gives rise to an important nonconcavity in the decision problem of the firms,
which necessitates a global analysis because the local fust-order conditions do not nece.ccarily
identify the solution to the problem we consider. This nonconcavity is the source of the
potential indeterminacy in sharing rules that attain a first-best outwme. This potential
indeterminacy is one feature that differentiates our results from the classic Bayesian
implrmentation result on public goods due to D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet [8]. As noted
above, we find that a first-best outcome may be attained even when transfer payments among
firms (i.e., entry fees) are not feasible prior to invention.
22. As noted, the second-stage development contest in our analysis imolves only two outcomes:
success or failure. This is in contrast to the models in [7] and [22], for example, where the
patent race occurs in continuotu time. A consequence of the continuous formulation is that26
"ties" are ruled out with probability one. Efficient development efforts are generally motivated
in these models only by reducing the payment to the fnst innovator below the social value of
his innovation. Unfortunately, the magnitude of the optimal "congestion tax" is generally
cumbersome to characterize in continuous models. In contrast, the optimal tax on ties in our
discrete fotTnulation is readily derived. A more recent analysis in the continuous-time setting
is [12]. In contrast to our model, the model in [12] does not permit payments among tivinner;"
at the various stages of the RBcD process. These payments are an integral component of our
fotmulation.
In other respects, our model has properties similar to those of the continuous-time
models. In particular, the aforementioned nonconcavity of the firms' mazimization problems
arises in both settings. (See [3] for an analysis of this issue in a continuous time setting.)
23. Other studies, such as ~5], [23], and [31], analyze contlicts between the attainment of efficiency
and dillcrcnt notions of propcrty rights or individual rationality. These studics are concerned
with private goods, in settings where production externalities do not arise. Our model may be
viewed, in part, as an extension of this line of research to an RBcD setting where public goods
(i.e., knowledge), endogenous effort choices, and the aforementioned "congestíon externalities"
all play important roles.
24. Recall that the symmetry reflected in (3.3) follows from the assumption that [1 - P]CP(P, n) is
strictly monotonic in P for all n.
25. T3e possibility that MN`t(n) ~ 0 when SN`t(n) ~ SN(n) arises because the subadditiviry ofthe
social payoff, SN(n), in R(n) ensures that P~`tl'(n) ~ PN'(n). A similar congestion eztemaliry
arises in the continuous-time model in [7]. Whether this possí-bility is realized depends on the
magnitude of the fixed cost, Co, in the C(P, n) function.27
26. It can be infcrred from (3.6) and (3.8) that neither ~rrR(n, d~ N) nor ~rr~(n, d ~N) is necessarily
monotonic in d. This is the case because even though the marginal expected return from
disclosure for a firm may be positive for "high" disclosures of Icnowledge, it may be negative for
smaller disclosures. In particular, the marginal èxpected payoff from disclosure at a given level
of d is decreasing in n because PN(n, d), defined in (3.10), is increasing in n and decreasing in
d. Coasequently, the fact that the necessary condition for optimal disclosure is satisfied at d
- n does not guarantee that full disclosure is globally optímal. This nonconcavity in the firm's
problem implies that a global analysis is required.
It is also the case that the marginal incentives for disclosure are not everywhere greater
undcr lll. than undcr RL (or vicc versa). Morc prcciscly, it can be shown that
sign ~~U(d' n ~ N) -~R(d' n ~ N)~- - sign
(dMN(n)1
dd dd o l dn J
~ 0 if PN'(n) 5 1 and d[C(PN'(n), n)] ~ 0;
N dn
~ 0 if PN'(n) ? N and án[C(PN'(n), n)) ~ 0.
Notice that dMN(n) ~ 0 can occur because of the negative externality of ties that firms
dn
impcue on each other's second-stage payoffs, even though dSN(n) ~ 0 always.
dn
27. It should be noted that the result in Proposition 1 is related to the finding in [8), although we
incorporate the additional features of: (1) productive spillovets from disclosed knowledge; and
(2) an cndogcnous numbcr of tirms.
28. Notice that participation by N firms will result under free entry into the second-stage RBcD28
contest if MN"(n) ~ 0.
29. Notice that this inefficiency could be reduced if the licensing scheme specified a maximum level
of disclosure for which compensation would be.paid.
30. It should be emphasized that the antitrust conccrns here are not with the usual problems of
collusion in the product market, but with er ante agreements concerning RáD activities and
the use of developed technologies. In practice, it may be difficult for antitrust authorities to
detect and prove that a firm is not employing a technology it has developed.
31. One might reasonably interpret our conclusions as providing support for the "rule of reason"
treatment afforded RJV's under the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984.
32. In the case of perfectly complementary knowledge, where firm i's Itnowledge is of no value
without the knowledge of fitm j and vice versa, recursive implementation of the licensing
mechanism in [20] may prove valuable in motivatíng the sharing of knowledge. With less
extreme fotms of complementary knowledge, complex public goods problems beyond those in
[8] will generally arise because the sharing of knowledge will alter firms' cost functions.
33. See the interesting description in [19J of how the Japanese VISI Consortium was structured
to promotc a varicty of research programs.
34. A useful dcscription of the incentive structures employed by MCC is presented in [27].
35. In [1], we assume binary support for the underlying knowledge level. This simplification is
introduced to avoid the nonconcavity in the fums' problem that complicates the present
analysis.29
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1.
Only the symmetry ref)ected in (iii) needs discussion. It is appazent that a fust-best outcome
requires
N
V~ [1 - PN'(n)] - CP(PN.(n), n) - ~ f07 i- 1, ..., Il.
j-1
j~i
Therefore, for f, c e{1, ..., N}, ( r~c,
IJ




V~ [1 - Pj'(n)] - CP(PR'(n)r n)~[1 - P~'(n)].
1'~
1'ti~
(Al) and (A2) imply:
CP(P.~(n), n)[1 - P~'(n)] - CP(P~'(n). n)[1 - P~'(n)].
Hence, since CP(P, n)[1 - P] is strictly monotonic in P by assumption, (A3) implies P~(n) - P ~(n).
Proof of Propositlon 1.
Let us focus on a particular firm i and assume that all other firms truthfully reveal their level
of knowledge, i.e., dj - nj for all j w i. L.et q; - Max {nj~j Mi}. Then,
a) if n; ~ q;, firm i's expected net payoff is always zero, independent of his disclosure;
b) if n; ~ q;, firm i's payoff is ma~tnized at d; - n; since this report ensures it the full social
surplus, which is maumized at d; - n; given the optimal number of fumc.30
I'roof of Propositton 2.
ln the ensuing calculations, the reference to N is dropped, but should be understood. From
(3.6),
~ ád~d) '{ V[1-P'(d)JN-1 - CP(P(n,d),n) r C~-~(d) ~dP(n,d)
- V IP(n,d)[N- t][1-P`(d)JN-Z dddd) } dáad)J C~-~(d) . T(d)BN-1(d)
where gN-t(x) - d~ 1(x).
dx
From (3.10), the expression in the first { }-brackets in (A4) vanishes. Also from (3.7),
dT(d) - lN-IJ i(1-P'(d)JN-2 J1'JN-1JP'(d)J - [1 - P'(d)JN-~ 1 dP`(d)







. {NP'(d)-P(n,d)}Crt`~-t(d) . VT(d)gH-t(d)
(A4)
(A6)
The expression in (A6) is strictly positive if
NP~(d) ~ P(n, d),31
which is true if P'(n) ~ 1. Therefore xrR(n, n) ~~rrR(n, d) for all d e[~, n).
N
For the asymptotic results, we need a preliminary characterization.
Lemma Al. Suppose PN'(n) satisfies (3.9) b' N. Then lim PN'(n) - 0 d n.
N"
ProoL Suppose lim PN'(n) - S(n) ~ 0. Then lim V{1 - PN'(n)}N-t - lim V{1 - S(n)}N-t - 0.
N-~ N~ N-~
(3.9) implies that lim V{1 - PN'(n)}N-t - lim CP(PN'(n), n) - CP(S(n), n) ~ 0, by assumption.
N-e N-~
Hence, the proof is complete by contradiction.
0
Proof of Propositioe 3.
Since we will focus only on the level of knowledge n, let PN' - PN'(n) and Cp(P) - CP(P, n).
Dividing both sides of (3.9) by V, taking the naturallog and rearranging provides
- IUg (I - i'N') - (IOg (V I CP(PN'))I ~ (N - I). (A7)
Noticc that if CP(o) ~ V ~ e, then log (V ~ Cp(0)) ~ 1.
Let S ~ 0 bc dcfincd by
log (V I CP(0)) - 1 f S
Now choose K~ 0 sufficiently large to ensure
(1-SIK)[1 tS-SIK] ~ 1. (A9)32





From Lemma A1, we also know that:
lim CP(PN~) - Cp(O) .
N-o
(All)
From (A10) and (Al l), there eiásts an No such that for N~ Na,
PN' ~[1 - S I K] [- log(1 - PN')], (A12)
and
log(V ~ Cp(PN')) ~ log (V ~ CP(0)) - S 1 K. (A13)
Therefore, for all N~ No,
PN' ~[1 - S I K] [log(V I CP(PN'))] ~[N - 1]
~ [1-SIK][log(V~CP(0))-S1K]~[N-1]
-[i-S~K][[1 tS-S~K]I[N-1]
~ 1 ~ N. (A14)
The first inequality follows from (A~ and (A12), the second from (A13), and the last from (A9).
The equality follows from (A8). Then, using Proposition 2, the proof is complete.
0
Proof of Proposition 4.
From Lemma Al, lim MN(d) - 0 for all d, where MN(d) is defined by (3.4). Therefore, ftom
N~
(3.11) and from the fact that E(d) - MN(d),
lim {~r~(n,n) - -rrR(n,n)} ~ lim {(N - 1)MN(n)} (A15)
N-o N~33
- lim ~ (N-i)VPN.(n)[1-PN.(n)]N-t - (N-1)C(PN`(n))~. (A16)
N~
Multiplying both sides of (3.9) by (N - 1)PN'(n) yields
[N - 1] V PN~(n)I~ - PN'(n)}N-t -[N - 1] PN~(R)CP(P"'(n)). (A17)
However, since CP ~ 0 and CpP ~ 0, (A17) implies
[N - 1] V PN'(n)[1 - PN'(n)]N-t ?[N - 1] C(PN'(n)) t1 N. (A18)
Therefore, in order to prove part (i) of the proposition, it suffices to show that
lim {(N - 1) V P"'(n)[1 - P"'(n)]"-'} - 0 if Cp(0, n)) - 0.
N~





Therefore, trom (A17) and (A19), and since lim {[log (V ! Cp(PN'))] Cp(PN')} e~rists,
N~
lim {(N-1)VPN"[1-PN']N-t} - lim {[log(VICp(PN'))]CP(PN')}
Ny. N-. (AZO)
- 0 if CP(0) - 0.
The last equality follows trom Lemma Al, using L'Hospital's rule. This completes the proof of part
(i) of the proposition.
To prove part (ii), let SN - V[1 -(1 - PN')N] - NC(PN') be the social surplus given the
(socially optimal) probability of success PN'. Then, using the envelope theorem,34
dSN - V[1 - PN'JN log (1 I[1 - PN']) - C(PN')
dN
- V{[1 - pN']N log (i ~ [1 - pN']) - pN' [1 - pN'7N-1 }
f V PN' [1 - PN']N-t - C(PN'). 1
Therefore,
j~f-t dSN N N N 1 IoS(l~[1-P"'1) - N [ I- - [N-1]VP '[i-P '] - 1 . [N-1JM , (A22) dN pN.l[1-PN'J
where MN - V PN' [1 - PN']N-1 - C(PN').
Now, for a given V and a given cost function (and ignoring integer problems):
dSN - 0 at the socially optimal number of 6rms. (A23)
dN
Therefore, if {N} i is a sequence of the socially optimal number of firms for a subsequence of cost
functions for which the left-hand side of equation (A22) is identically zero, then
N
lim [N-1] dS - 0.
N-e dN




log(1~[1-P ']) - lim
log x- 1 (A25)
N~ PN'~[1-PN.] rl x-1
(by L'Hospital's rule), where x- 1 ~(I - PN') and using the fact that lim PN' - 0. Therefore, by
N~
(A22), (A23), (A24), and (A25), we know that lim [N - IJMN - 0.
N~
Therefore, by (A15), the proof is complete.35
Pnwf of Pmpositlon 5.
lf N- 2 and F(n) - 1, lhen for n~ d~ n:
,rR(n, d) tt V PZ(n, d) - C(PZ(n, d), n). (A26)
Notice that PZ(n, d) and P2'(d) are continuous functions of d on the interval [~ n]. Therefore if a
firm with knowledge n~ n discloses n f y and if y~ 0 is sufficiently small, itc payoff will be
aR(n, n f y) ~ V PZ(n, n) - C(PZ(n. n), n)- (A27)
If, on the other hand, the firm fully discloses n, its payoff will be
,rR(n, n) ~ V P2~(n) - C(P2~(n), n). (A2g)
Therefore, if P~'(n) - e~ 0, then for e and y sufficiently small,
,rR(n. n) -,rR(n, n f y) - V P2~(n) - C(P2~(n). n)
-[V PZ(n, n) - C(PZ(n, n), n)]
~0. (~9)
The inequality in (A29) follows from the fact that if e is sufficiently small, then by (3.10), PZ(n, n)
satisfies
V- CP(PZ(n, n), n) - 0,
which implies thaL
PZ(n, n) - argmax {VP - C(P, n)}. - p
Proof of Proposition 6.
M example will suffice as prooE Suppose
V- 1, N- 2, n- 0, n- 1, F(0) - 1 and C(P, n) - max{0, [PZl2 - 1~8] [1 - n]}.
Then Cp(P, n) - P[1 - nJ, PZ~(d) - 1~[2 - d] and P(n, d) -[1 - dJ~((2 - d)(1 -n)J in the relevant36
rangc.
Now observe that
PZ'(0) - .s, C(PZ'(0), 0) - 0,
Pz'(.u) - .s~, c(Pz'(.u), .u) - .ozs~,
PZ(.u. 0) - -666, C(PZ(.25, 0), .2S) - .0729.
Since PZ'(0) -.5, we know from Proposition 2 that full disclosure of knowledge is motivated under
RL. We shall show, however, that with N- 2, the social surplus is higher if the firm with knowledge
level n- .25 discloses none rather than all of its knowledge.
With full disclosure, the social surplus is
SZ(nt - nZ - .25) - 1 - {1 - [PZ'(.2s)]}2 - 2 C(PZ'(.25), .2s) - .7577.
With no disclosure, the corresponding social surplus is:
SZ(nt -.25, n2 - 0) - PZ(.25. 0) f[1 - PZ(.25, 0)]PZ'(0)
- c(Pz(.zs, o), .zs) - c(P2'(o). o)
- .~596.
Thus, the social surplus absent any disclosure is higher than the social surplus under full disclosure.
To see the nature of the critical externality, notice that with F(n) - 1, firm 1 will disclose its
knowledge n~ n fully if and only if:
0 ~{P2'(n) - C(P2~(n), n)} -{P(n, n)[1 - PZ'(n)] f[P2~(n))Z - C(P(n, 4). n))-
On the other hand, no disclosure (dl - n) is socially optimal if:
0~{2P2'(n) -[PZ'(n)]2 - 2C(PZ'(n), n)} -{P(n, n) f PZ'(n) - P(n, n)PZ'(n)
- C(P(n, n), n) - C(PZ'(~, n)}.
These two conditions imply:
0~ Mz(n) - MZ(n) -{PZ'(n)[1 - Pz'(n)] - C(PZ'(n), n)} -{Pz'(~)(1 - PZ'(n)] - C(PZ'(~, n)}. ri37
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